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A CONTRAST OF STATE AND FEDERAL
COURT AUTHORITY TO GRANT HABEAS
RELIEF
Honorable Laura Denvir Stith*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Reviewing petitions for writs of habeas corpus has always been one
of the duties of members of the Supreme Court of Missouri. It was not,
however, until two cases were argued in the first few months of 2003
that those duties required the Court to directly determine whether the
authority of state high courts to grant habeas relief was broader than that
of their counterparts on the federal bench.
On February 24, 2003, the case of State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper' was
argued to the Supreme Court of Missouri. 2 The key issue was whether
Joseph Amrine was entitled to have his claim of actual innocence heard
by the Missouri courts by way of a writ of habeas corpus, even though
he had already seemingly exhausted his rights to direct and postconviction relief. The State asserted in its brief, and in oral argument,
that Mr. Amrine had no right to additional review, whatever the nature
of his current claims and whatever the strength of the evidence
supporting them. I, therefore, asked the Assistant Attorney General
arguirii the case, "Are you suggesting, ... even if we find that Mr.
Amrine is actually innocent, he should be executed?" 3 The Assistant
Attorney General answered: "That's correct, your honor." 4
While some later commentators were shocked by the answer given
by the Assistant Attorney General, I was not. That was the only answer
he could give in light of the legal position taken by the State of Missouri
in opposing Mr. Amrine's petition for writ of habeas corpus. If a state

* Judge, Supreme Court of Missouri. B.A. Magna Cum Laude 1975, Tufts University; J.D.
Magna Cum Laude 1978, Georgetown University Law Center. I gratefully appreciate the
invaluable assistance of Steven M. Berezney and Michele Mekel in preparing this article.
1
102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).
2
See infra Part II.
3
For a webcast of Supreme Court of Missouri oral arguments, see
http://www.missourinet.com/gestalt/go.cfm?objectid=19BA8AD0-7077-4B92A55E0121C058CC65. See also Adam Liptak, ProsecutorsSee Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,2003, at Al.
4
Id.
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high court has no authority to review a claim of actual innocence, then it
follows that it is powerless to prevent the prisoner's execution.
One month before Amrine was argued, State v. Whitfield5 was argued
to the Supreme Court of Missouri. 6 The key issue was the potential
application to Joseph Whitfield of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ring v. Arizona,7 holding that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution requires all factual determinations required
for imposition of the death penalty under state law to be made by a jury. 8
Mr. Whitfield's jury had been deadlocked in the penalty phase of his
trial, and the judge ultimately had imposed the death penalty. The State
argued that, even if Ring would have applied had Mr. Whitfield's case
been on direct appeal, it did not apply to him because his conviction had
already been affirmed. 9 Thus, the State argued, the federal courts would
not apply Ring to Mr. Whitfield's case, and the State of Missouri was
powerless to apply Ring more broadly than would the federal courts.
II.

STATE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW FREESTANDING CLAIMS OF ACTUAL
INNOCENCE

A.

Mr. Amrine's Direct and Post-ConvictionAppeals
As Missouri's Supreme Court has summarized the facts of Amrine:
On October 18, 1985, inmate Gary Barber was
stabbed to death in a recreation room at the Jefferson
City Correctional Center. Officer John Noble identified
inmate Terry Russell as the perpetrator. While being
questioned about Barber's murder, Russell claimed that
Amrine admitted that he had stabbed Barber. Amrine
was charged with Barber's murder. 10

Six inmates and a guard testified that Mr. Amrine was not near Gary
Barber at the time of the stabbing; three inmates, including Terry Russell,
testified that Mr. Amrine committed the murder. Mr. Amrine was

6
7

107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003).
See infra Part III.
536 U.S. 584 (2002).

8

Id. at 589.

9
10

Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 265.
Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo. 1987).
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convicted and received the death penalty. His conviction was affirmed
on appeal."
Mr. Amrine, like most death row prisoners, unsuccessfully sought
post-conviction relief in state and federal courts based on various alleged
constitutional errors in his trial. Like many prisoners, Mr. Amrine
continued to maintain his innocence. Unlike most such prisoners,
however, Mr. Amrine presented substantial newly discovered evidence
in support of his claims.
In Missouri, initial post-conviction motions seeking relief from a
conviction or sentence must be brought under Missouri Supreme Court
Rule 29.15.12 In support of his Rule 29.15 motion, Mr. Amrine presented
the testimony of two of his three accusers, Terry Russell and Randy
Ferguson. Mr. Russell testified that he lied at the trial and implicated
Mr. Amrine to deflect suspicion from himself. Mr. Ferguson said he had
lied at the trial in return for being placed in protective custody, and the
dropping of a felony weapons charge. But, this still left the testimony of
inmate Jerry Poe, identifying Mr. Amrine as the assailant. The state and
subsequent federal courts considering Mr. Amrine's post-conviction
motions found Mr. Poe's testimony an adequate basis to support the
judgment, and denied Mr. Amrine's requests that his sentence be
13
vacated and that he receive a new trial.
New counsel was then able to locate Jerry Poe. In a sworn affidavit,
Mr. Poe also recanted his testimony, stating he had lied originally in
return for a promise to move him out of the penitentiary to protect him
from sexual predators. This meant that all three persons who had
identified Mr. Amrine as the murderer had recanted. The Eighth Circuit
remanded for a hearing in the district court on Mr. Amrine's gateway
14
claim of actual innocence based on the three recantations.
The district court denied relief, stating that, as Mr. Russell and Mr.
Ferguson had already recanted while the case was in state court, only
Mr. Poe's recantation could be considered "new evidence."
Thus,
considered in isolation, the court found the inmate's recantation was not
reliable or credible. Therefore, the federal courts could not afford Mr.

11

State v. Amrine, 741 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. 1987).
Rule 29.15.
13
Amrine v. State, 785 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1990); Amrine v. Bowersox, No. 90-0940-CV-W-2
at 16 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1996).
14
Amrine v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1997).
12
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Amrine habeas relief. The Eighth Circuit agreed and affirmed.1 5 The
16
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
B.

Petitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court of Missouri

It was at this point that Mr. Amrine made a final bid for habeas
corpus relief directly in the Supreme Court of Missouri. He argued that,
because the recantations had been made over a long period of time, and
because the last of them had been made after all state direct and postconviction review had been exhausted, no court had ever looked at the
entire record to determine whether he was entitled to habeas relief. He
was actually innocent of the crime, he argued. 17 This should at least
provide a "gateway" for consideration of his underlying constitutional
claims under Schlup v. Delo.i8 And, he argued, even if he could
demonstrate no underlying constitutional violation, his freestanding
claim of actual innocence, considered alone, should be enough to entitle
him to release or a new trial where, as here, all of the inculpatory
evidence from his trial had been discredited. The State of Missouri
strongly disagreed with Mr. Amrine's position. Our Court found
sufficient merit in these assertions to set the case for full briefing and
argument.
The State took the position in its brief that we, as Missouri's highest
court, had no authority even to hear Mr. Amrine's petition, much less to
grant him habeas relief. First, the State argued, Mr. Amrine was
collaterally estopped from arguing that the original trial testimony of the
three recanting witnesses was not credible or that their recantations were
credible, as he had lost those arguments when the recantations were
considered seriatim at earlier stages. Therefore, we were without
authority to grant him relief, even if we would have found that the three
recantations, considered together, undermined our confidence in the
validity of the underlying judgment against Mr. Amrine.
Second, the State argued, even if collateral estoppel did not apply,
unless he could prove that there was an underlying constitutional
violation-and it quickly became evident that he would not be able to do

Amrine v. Bowersox, 238 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2001). See infra text accompanying notes
31-35 for a discussion of the meaning of the term "gateway claims."
16
Amrine v. Luebbers, 534 U.S. 963 (2001).
17 Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. 1987).
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
18

15
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so-the Missouri courts were again powerless to grant Mr. Amrine any
relief. In support, the State cited Herrerav. Collins19 and Schlup.20
In Herrera,because of his difficulty in making a claim of either cause
and prejudice or an underlying constitutional violation, Mr. Herrera
asserted (among other arguments) that he was entitled to habeas corpus
relief if he made a showing of newly discovered evidence of his
innocence, even if he were not able to show an underlying constitutional
violation.21 Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed this argument at length in
22
a discussion that has variously been characterized as holding or dicta.
The Chief Justice explained the reasons why the federal courts
should not grant relief for a freestanding claim of actual innocence:
[O]ne could say that as far as our system of justice is
concerned, the innocent defendant's claim of innocence
has been extinguished, that he has had all the process
that is due him. Found guilty, and his conviction now
final, he is guilty in the only relevant sense we need
consider: a fair procedure determined that he is guilty. 23
If the petitioner alleges that he did not receive a full and fair trial due
to constitutional error, then habeas review is available in the federal
courts. But, if the state trial was constitutionally adequate, then, Herrera
suggested, federal habeas relief is not available unless federal courts are
to become yet another forum for appeal of factual determinations made
by state courts. This is a role to which they are not suited, for:
[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are
not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to
correct errors of fact....
...
"Federal courts are not forums in which to
relitigate state trials." Barefoot v. Estelle.... Few rulings

19 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
20 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
21 Herrera,506 U.S. at 396.
22 Id. at 398-416; see also George C. Thomas Il1, Gordon G. Young, Keith Sharfman & Kate
B. Briscoe, Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U.
Prr. L. REv. 263, 285 (2003) ("Though some have treated the constitutional status of a freestanding claim of innocence as settled by Herrera, [footnote omitted] we think Herrera did
not go that far.").
23 Thomas, supra note 22, at 264; see also Herrera,506 U.S. at 399-400.
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would be more disruptive of our federal system than to
provide for federal habeas review of freestanding claims
of actual innocence. 24
For this reason, Herrerasuggests further that:
[A] claim of "actual innocence" is not itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his
otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the
merits.
... The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception
is available "only where the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence."25

Chief Justice Rehnquist, thus, would inquire only whether the
petitioner were entitled to due process review, and if there were no
claimed underlying constitutional error, he would never reach the
question whether the petitioner were in fact innocent. 26 He said a truly
27
innocent petitioner must rely on state clemency proceedings for relief.
In seeming self-contradiction, Chief Justice Rehnquist then said:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in
deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence" made
after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if
there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim.28
Then, in keeping with his concern for avoiding undue interference
with state courts, the Chief Justice continued:

24
25

Herrera,506 U.S. at 400-01 (citations omitted).
Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,454 (1986)).

26

Id. at 408 n.6.

27

Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.

28
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But because of the very disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on
the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous
burden that having to retry cases based on often stale
evidence would place on the States, the threshold
showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be
extraordinarily high. The showing made by petitioner in
29
this case falls far short of any such threshold.
"[T]he dual principles of federalism and finality served as recurring
30
themes throughout Chief Justice Rehnquist's [plurality] opinion."
Habeas actions are not simply a supplemental part of the state appellate
process, but rather are original actions intended to protect the federal
constitutional rights of the petitioner. Therefore, Herrera teaches, in the
interest of comity, so as to show proper deference to and respect for the
judgments of state courts and to avoid undue disruption of the criminal
justice systems in the states, such relief should be given only where
underlying constitutional error is also present.
Two years after Herrera, the United States Supreme Court addressed
a situation in which a Missouri petitioner claimed underlying
constitutional error deprived him of evidence that would have
established his innocence. 31 For the Supreme Court, this was a key
difference:
As a preliminary matter, it is important to explain
the difference between Schlup's claim of actual
innocence and the claim of actual innocence asserted in
Herrerav. Collins. In Herrera,the petitioner advanced his
claim of innocence to support a novel substantive
constitutional claim, namely, that the execution of an
innocent
person
would
violate
the
Eighth
32
Amendment ....

29

Id.

Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v.
Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489,494 (1998).
31
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
32
Id. at 313-14 (citation omitted).
30

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 [2004], Art. 6

428

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.38

Schlup, in contrast, accompanies his claim of
innocence with an assertion of constitutional error at
trial. For that reason, Schlup's conviction may not be
entitled to the same degree of respect as one, such as
Herrera's, that is the product of an error free trial.... [IV
a petitioner such as Schlup presents evidence of innocence so
strong that a court cannot have confidence in the
outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that
the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the
petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and
33
argue the merits of his underlying claims.
Thus, if a petitioner has an underlying federal constitutional claim,
then a claim of innocence will serve as a "gateway" through which the
petitioner can pass and receive consideration of his otherwise defaulted
constitutional claim. 34 Alternatively, if a petitioner presents evidence of
cause for the failure to raise the constitutional error earlier, and prejudice
resulting from it, then this can also serve as a "gateway" for
35
consideration of his underlying federal constitutional claim.
In the abstract, Schlup's demarcation of the limits of federal habeas
corpus jurisprudence would not necessarily have any application to how
Missouri or other states applied the writ. As noted by Judge Ronnie L.
White in his dissenting opinion in Clay v. Dormire,36 Missouri historically
has granted habeas relief in the case of "manifest injustice," and has
found manifest injustice in situations in which the reasons for the
prisoner's failure to timely raise his claim on direct appeal or in his
original post-conviction motion did not arise from his own lack of
diligence. 37 Until Clay, Missouri had never required a showing of
38
innocence as a gateway to reach the petitioner's underlying claim.
The majority in Clay, in an opinion authored by Judge Stephen N.
Limbaugh, adopted the Schlup standard for federal court review of habeas
corpus claims in cases in which the petitioner makes an otherwise
untimely claim that his conviction resulted from a constitutionally

33

Id. at 316 (emphasis added).

34

Id.at 315.

35 Id. at 314-15.
3
37 S.W.3d 214, 219-22 (Mo. 2000) (White, J.,
dissenting) (Judge White has since become
Chief Judge).
37 Id. at 219-20 (White, J.,
dissenting).
3
Id. at 220-21 (White, J., dissenting).
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inadequate trial.39 The majority did not specifically analyze why that
standard would effectively preempt Missouri's more traditional
application of habeas corpus. Rather, it pointed out that the United
States Supreme Court had adopted the Schlup standard because it
believed that:
"[E]xplicitly tying the miscarriage of justice exception to
innocence thus accommodates both the systemic
interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial
resources, and the overriding individual interest in
doing justice in the 'extraordinary case."'
These
interests, excluding comity, of course, justify the same
approach in Missouri. Indeed, the actual innocence
component is all the more appropriate for Missouri cases
given the fact that defendants are already afforded an
initial habeas-like post-conviction relief proceeding
under Rule 29.15 or Rule 24.035 in which constitutional
claims (usually involving ineffective assistance of trial
counsel) like those that so often appear in habeas corpus
40
petitions may be presented.
At least some other state courts have also adopted the Schlup standard
41
for similar reasons.
The facts of the case before it did not require Clay to address whether
cause and prejudice also provided a basis for habeas relief in Missouri.
Later, in Brown v. State,42 the State argued that Missouri should not
recognize a cause-and-prejudice exception to the time limitations for
post-conviction relief set out in the Missouri Supreme Court Rules. 43 The
court rejected this argument in Brown and in State ex rel. Nixon v.
Jaynes,44 holding that either a showing of probable innocence or a
showing of cause and prejudice suffice as a "gateway" permitting review

39

Id. at 217.

40 Id. at 217-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986)).
41 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 794 N.E.2d 367 (111.App. Ct. 2003); State v. Redcrow, 980 P.2d
622 (Mont. 1999); Pelligrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519 (Nev. 2001); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d
202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
42 66 S.W.3d 721 (Mo. 2002).
43 Id. at 723. At the time Whitfield brought his motion under Rule 29.15; that time limit
was ninety days from the date that the mandate affirming his conviction was issued.
Effective January 1, 2003, a petitioner now has 180 days to bring such a motion. See also
Rule 24.035.
4
63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. 2001).
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of petitioner's otherwise procedurally defaulted claims of constitutional
45
error.
Amrine presented the first occasion for Missouri courts to address
whether they would also adopt Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach in
Herrera as to freestanding claims of actual innocence. The State argued
that Missouri should do so. Quoting Herrera, it noted that the Eighth
Circuit had held in cases such as Mansfield v. Dormire46 that, under
Herrera, a claim of actual innocence can act only as a gateway to
consideration of other constitutional error, and cannot in itself provide a
basis for habeas corpus relief.
The Missouri courts, the State then argued, had no more authority to
grant habeas relief than did the federal courts. Therefore, even if Mr.
Amrine made a substantial claim of actual innocence, he simply was not
entitled to relief in the courts of Missouri. His remedy, if one was
available, was solely by a petition to the Governor for clemency.
Although the State did not cite to any case in support of this
position, simply taking it as a given that the state courts could not have
more authority than the federal courts in this area, it might have cited
State v. Watson.47
After interpreting Herrera as holding that a
freestanding claim of actual innocence is simply not cognizable in federal
courts, Watson held:
Since the United States Supreme Court has not
recognized actual innocence as a constitutional right, we
also refuse to judicially create such a constitutional right.
The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's
claim of actual innocence because his claim fails to raise
"a denial or infringement of [appellant's] rights under
the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States."48
Similarly, the appellate court in Hays v. State49 simply assumed that it
could not recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence if the
federal courts would not do so, stating that, because petitioner did not

45
46
47

Brown, 66 S.W.3d at 731.
202 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2000).
710 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).

48

Id. at 345.

49

975 P.2d 1181 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999).
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allege an underlying constitutional violation, his claim was one of a
violation of substantive rather than procedural due process, and was
procedurally barred because not timely raised under Schlup.50
The State reaffirmed its position at oral argument that no state
avenue of relief was available to consider Mr. Amrine's claims of
innocence. But, neither in its briefs nor in its argument did it directly
acknowledge the necessary consequence of this argument: even for
persons, such as Mr. Amrine, who could present substantial evidence of
their innocence, such evidence could not be considered as a basis for
habeas relief from a death sentence. I, therefore, put the question to the
Assistant Attorney General arguing on behalf of the State, "Are you
suggesting, ... even if we find that Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he
should be executed?" 51 A few minutes later, Judge Michael A. Wolff
asked, "To make sure we are clear on this, ... if we find in a particular
case that DNA evidence absolutely excludes somebody as the murderer,
then we must execute them anyway if we can't find an underlying
52
constitutional violation at their trial?"
To both questions, the Assistant Attorney General answered in the
affirmative. Given the position taken by the State in its brief, there was
no other answer he could give. If a state court were not free to consider a
freestanding claim of actual innocence, and if that is the only claim Mr.
Amrine had to make, then that meant that the court system was
powerless to stop his execution even in the face of a persuasive showing
of innocence.
C. Missouri Recognizes Power of State Courts to Grant Habeas Relief for
FreestandingClaims of Actual Innocence
The Supreme Court of Missouri issued its decision in Amrine in a 4-3
decision authored by Judge Richard B. Teitelman. The Court rejected the
position taken by the State. It held that, even if Herrera could be
interpreted to generally foreclose relief in the federal courts for such
freestanding claims of innocence, Herrera implicitly recognized the
authority of state courts to grant such relief more broadly, for it stated
that it would assume for the sake of argument that, "in a capital case a
truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence made after trial

50
51

52

Id. at 1185.
See supranote 3 and accompanying text.
Id.
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would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
53
claim."
As Amrine later noted, two conclusions can be drawn from the
quoted language. First, the United States Constitution may grant the
federal courts the authority to intervene in the extreme case in which a
state insists on executing a clearly innocent person. Second, the Supreme
Court recognized that state courts can intervene upon a lesser showing,
for, as Amrine stated the point:
[Elven if a federal court were found not to have
jurisdiction to review a state conviction and sentence in
the absence of a federal constitutional issue, this would
not deprive a state court from reviewing the conviction
and sentence if its own state habeas law so permitted.
The issue now before this Court, then, is whether, in the
words of Herrera,Missouri has left a "state avenue open
4
to process such a claim."M
Amrine then determined that Missouri has left a "state avenue [of
relief] open" to process claims of actual innocence.55 First, it noted, our
prior cases have recognized that habeas corpus relief is available to
prevent manifest injustice.5 6 Second, section 565.035.357 provides that, in
reviewing death sentences, this Court is to examine not merely the
sufficiency but also "the strength of the evidence."5 8 Amrine then stated,
"It is difficult to imagine a more manifestly unjust and unconstitutional
result than permitting the execution of an innocent person." 59 Because a
person, like Mr. Amrine, who has been convicted in a constitutionally
adequate trial no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, however,
Amrine placed the burden of proof on Mr. Amrine to "make a clear and

53 Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Mo. 1987) (emphasis added) (citing Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993)).
54 Id. at 546-47 (quoting Herrera,506 U.S. at 417).
55 Id. at 547.
56 Id. at 546 (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Mo. 2001); State ex rel.
Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443,446 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
57

Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.035.3 (2000).

58

Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547.

59

Id.
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convincing showing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in
the correctness of the judgment." 60
Finding that Mr. Amrine made such a showing, in April of 2003, the
Court reversed Mr. Amrine's conviction and ordered his conditional
discharge unless the State elected within thirty days to file new
charges. 61 The State initially did file such charges, but a few months later
dropped them and released Mr. Amrine -nearly eighteen years after the
murder of which he had once been convicted.
D. Other State Decisions Recognizing Power of State Courts to Grant Habeas
Relief Based on FreestandingClaims of Actual Innocence
Amrine was by no means the first state decision to recognize a
freestanding claim of actual innocence. The California Supreme Court
addressed this issue as early as 1993, the year that Herrerawas decided,
in In re Clark.62 Clark focused on the seeming inconsistency between the
lengthy discussion by Chief Justice Rehnquist of the lack of authority of
the federal courts to grant relief based on actual innocence in the absence
of a constitutional violation, and the Court's grudging recognition that it
might be constitutionally required to grant relief if a truly persuasive
showing of innocence were made and the state courts denied any avenue
of relief, stating:
A refusal to consider a claim of factual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence would be
constitutionally suspect in a capital case. A majority of
the justices of the United States Supreme Court have
expressed a belief that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments preclude execution of an innocent person.
Their statements imply that in a capital case a claim of
actual innocence of the crime of which the petitioner
stands convicted must be considered regardless of when
63
it is raised or if constitutional error affected the verdict.

60 Id.at 548.
61 Id. at 550. In his dissent, Judge Duane Benton did not disagree that Missouri courts
had jurisdiction to grant relief; rather, he argued that a master should review the evidence
and pass on its credibility before deciding whether a jury should be permitted to hear it. Id.
dissenting).
at 550 (Benton, J.,
62 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993).
63
Id. at 760.
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The Clark court concluded that it was, therefore, "persuaded by
those views that such claims should be considered regardless of delay or
failure to include the claim in a prior petition and irrespective of whether
constitutional error contributed to the verdict." 6 Indeed, it said that,
"Since this court is not limited, as the federal courts are, to granting relief only
on the basis of constitutional error,"65 it would also consider claims that the
petitioner was innocent of the death penalty 66 and, in an appropriate
case, grant relief even in the absence of an underlying constitutional
67
violation.
The following year, in Summerville v. Warden, State Prison,68 the
Supreme Court of Connecticut also expressly recognized "that a
substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable by way of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by the petitioner
of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his
criminal trial." 69 Later Connecticut cases have reaffirmed the viability in
Connecticut of freestanding claims of actual innocence, holding that:
[Tihe proper standard for evaluating a freestanding
claim ... is twofold. First, the petitioner must establish

by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into
account all of the evidence-both the evidence adduced
at the original criminal trial and.., at the habeas corpus
trial-he is actually innocent of the crime of which he
Second, the petitioner must also
stands convicted.
establish that, after considering all of that evidence and
the inferences drawn therefrom as the habeas court did,

64

Id.

Id. (emphasis added).
That is, although he committed the murder, he is ineligible for the death penalty.
67
Clark, 855 P.2d at 760.
68
641 A.2d 1356 (Conn. 1994).
6
Id. at 1369. Summerville cites Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1992), as adopting a
similar standard prior to Herrera. Jones does hold that claims of newly discovered evidence
may be raised after the time for filing a motion for new trial has otherwise expired, if the
evidence is "of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." The
court did not address the issue in terms of freestanding claims of actual innocence,
however, and expressly found that its approach was in accord with that taken by federal
courts. Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915.
65
66
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no reasonable fact finder would find the petitioner guilty
70
of the crime.
Texas also recognized the right of a person sentenced to death for a
crime the petitioner alleges he did not commit to petition for relief under
state constitutional law in State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals.71 Holmes
held that "execution of an innocent person would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." 72 In 1997, Texas held that its constitution also forbade
"not just the execution, but the incarceration as well of an innocent
person." 73 Like Connecticut, and like Missouri would later hold in
Amrine, Texas held that proof of actual innocence must be made by clear
and convincing evidence. 74
Illinois has similarly upheld the right of state courts to recognize
freestanding claims of actual innocence, even if the federal courts choose
not to do so, in People v. Washington.75 As had Elizondo, Washington
addressed whether freestanding claims of actual innocence would be
recognized in a case in which a defendant did not receive the death
penalty. In Washington, the court stated:
It is no criticism to read Herrera as a conflicted
decision.
As Justice O'Connor said, claims of
innocence-even those in noncapital cases-present
troubling issues. We are, of course, bound by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States
Constitution. Conflicted or not, at least for noncapital
cases, Herreraclearly states ... that a freestanding claim
of innocence is not cognizable as a fourteenth
amendment due process claim. 76
Washington then recognized the petitioner's right to raise a
freestanding claim of actual innocence under the Illinois Constitution's
due process clause, stating, "we labor under no self-imposed constraint to

Correia v. Rowland, 820 A.2d 1009, 1022-23 (Conn. 2003) (quoting Miller v. Comnm'r
of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108 (1997)) (footnotes omitted).
71 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
7
Id. at 397.
73
Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202,204 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
74 Id. at 209.
75 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
70

76

Id. at 1335.
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follow federal precedent in 'lockstep' in defining Illinois' due process
protection."77 The court found that procedural due process required it to
recognize such a claim, for to ignore a claim of actual innocence would
be "fundamentally unfair." 78
Further, as a matter of substantive due process, Washington found
that, "[ilmprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience
shocking as to trigger operation of substantive due process" under the
More specifically, it explained, while the
Illinois Constitution.79
presumption of innocence no longer applies once a person is convicted
in a trial free of constitutional error, and thus he must be viewed as
guilty, the presumption of guilt should not be irrebuttable in the face of a
truly persuasive showing of actual innocence. Such a showing of
innocence "would, in hindsight, undermine the legal construct
precluding a substantive due process analysis" 80-that is, undermine the
assumption of guilt that applies once direct appeals are exhausted. The
Supreme Court of Illinois then concluded: "We therefore hold as a
matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that a claim of newly
discovered evidence showing a defendant to be actually innocent of the
crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as a matter of due
process." 81
These cases recognize that the authority of state courts to recognize
freestanding claims of actual innocence is not derivative of the
recognition of such claims in federal courts. Federal courts must be
concerned with issues of comity and deference to state courts and state
policies. If a state statute or state case law is in conflict with the federal
constitution, if a state fails to recognize a right that is granted by the
federal constitution, or if a conviction is affirmed despite an underlying
constitutional violation in the trial, then the federal courts may grant
relief if the petitioner shows cause and prejudice for the failure to timely
raise his claims or makes a gateway showing of actual innocence. But,

77

Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Id. at 1336.
Id.
90
Id.
81
Id. at 1337; see also State v. Conway, 816 So. 2d 290, 291 (La. 2002) (assuming that
Louisiana would follow Summerville, Washington, and similar cases in recognizing a
freestanding claim of actual innocence, but finding the showing made in such a case would
not meet the "extraordinarily high" standard of proof that would be required for such a
claim).
78

79
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beginning with Wainwright v. Sykes, 82 the United States Supreme Court
has narrowed the basis of federal habeas review and made federalism an
increasingly dominant factor in its decision making.8 3 In Herrera and
Schlup, it made clear that, in the absence of an underlying constitutional
violation, it would hold that principles of comity and deference preclude
a federal court from interfering with the judgment in a constitutionally
adequate trial. 84
This does not mean that the federal courts can never provide relief in
the face of a freestanding claim of actual innocence. It simply means
that, in order to set aside the conviction, the Supreme Court would have
to find the execution of a truly innocent petitioner constitutes a
constitutional violation (a proposition it has not as yet directly had to
confront and decide). This seems to be why the Chief Justice said that he
assumed, for purposes of the case, and Justice O'Connor said in her
concurring opinion, that it would be unconstitutional to execute a person
once a truly persuasive showing of actual innocence were made, if the
85
state truly refused to provide a remedy.
But, state courts can and, as is evident, often do provide a remedy
for such injustices under their state law, pursuant to their authority
under their state constitutions to grant writs of habeas corpus in cases of
actual innocence. Indeed, as other commentators have noted:
The states must recognize that since Herrera, they
shoulder most of the responsibility for providing review
of post-conviction claims of actual innocence, especially
in non-capital cases. This is particularly true since the
passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, for example, denies a
federal habeas court jurisdiction in a capital case if the
petitioner fails to raise his claim in state court, even if the
86
claim depends on an assertion of actual innocence.

82 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
83 Anderson, supra note 30, at 496.
84 Id. at 494-95; Eli Paul Mazur, "I'm Innocent": Addressing FreestandingClaims of Actual
Innocence in State and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 224-25 (2003); Thomas, supra
note 22, at 288.
85 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416, 419 (1993).
86 Anderson, supra note 30, at 498 (footnotes omitted).
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Moreover, even if federal courts were to broaden their scope of
review of state habeas claims of innocence, this would not lessen the
obligation of state courts to provide their own procedures for ensuring
that there is a forum in their own justice system for truly persuasive
showings of actual innocence.
III.

THE BROAD AUTHORITY OF STATE COURTS TO GIVE RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION TO FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

87
The Supreme Court of Missouri handed down State v. Whitfield two
months after its decision in Amrine. In Whitfield, the court further
explicated its authority, as a state court of last resort, to grant postconviction relief based on state law and principles, even where such
relief is not available under the more limited review procedures followed
by federal courts in reviewing habeas claims based on state criminal
convictions.

In 1994, a jury convicted Mr. Whitfield of first-degree murder. A
separate penalty phase followed.88 Missouri penalty-phase criminal
procedure requires jurors to go through four steps, and provides that
they must assess punishment at life imprisonment, rather than death,
unless they determine all four steps against the defendant. These steps
require the jurors to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of a statutory aggravating factor; that the evidence in
aggravation warrants imposing a death sentence; that mitigating
evidence does not outweigh that in aggravation; and that "under all of
the circumstances" the juror believes he or she should assess punishment
89
as death.

87
8
89

107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 258. Specifically, at the time of Mr. Whitfield's trial, section 565.030.4 stated:
The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment
without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the
governor:
(1) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least
one of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in
subsection 2 of section 565.032; or
(2) If the trier does not find that the evidence in aggravation of
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the
statutory aggravating circumstances listed in subsection 2 of
section 565.032, warrants imposing the death sentence; or
(3) If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol38/iss2/6

Stith: A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas R

2004]

Authority to GrantHabeas Relief

439

In Mr. Whitfield's case, the jury deadlocked 11-to-1 in favor of life
imprisonment. Although Missouri requires jurors to specify which
statutory aggravating factor(s) they find, it does not otherwise require
the jury to specify how they voted on each of the four steps set out in the
statute. Therefore, nothing in the verdict form itself allowed the trial or
appellate courts to determine at what point the jury had deadlocked. 90
Pursuant to section 565.030.4, 91 the trial judge, therefore, himself made
independent findings as to each of the four steps set out in the statute.
He resolved each step against the defendant, and imposed the death
penalty. 92 Mr. Whitfield's conviction and sentence of death were
affirmed on appeal, and post-conviction relief was denied. 93
Then, in 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in Ring v.
Arizona94 that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
entitles "[c]apital defendants ...to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum
punishment." 95 The only exception generally recognized is where the
statutory aggravating factor is a prior conviction; as a prior conviction is
96
a matter of record, a judge rather than a jury can determine it.
Mr. Whitfield argued that, in section 565.030, 97 Missouri's legislature
had conditioned the imposition of the death penalty on a finding against
the defendant on each of the four steps set out in the statute. In Mr.
Whitfield's case, prior convictions for manslaughter and second-degree
murder were the statutory aggravating factors, and thus, those were not
required to be found by the jury. But, he argued, steps 2 and 3 also
required factual findings by the jury, or mixed findings of fact and
opinion. Therefore, even if the trial judge could make the finding against
the defendant on step 1 based on his prior convictions, the judge could

statutory mitigating circumstances listed in subsection 3 of
section 565.032, which is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in
aggravation of punishment found by the trier; or
(4) If the trier decides under all of the circumstances not to assess
and declare the punishment at death.
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (1994).
90
Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 262-63.
91
Mo. REV.STAT. § 565.030.4.
9

Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 261-62.

93

State v. Whitfield, 939 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 831 (1997).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 585.
Mo. REV.STAT. § 565.030 (2000).

94
95
96
97
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not do so on steps 2 or 3. And, because Missouri instructions did not
require jurors to reveal at what step they deadlocked, a reviewing court
could not presume that the jurors had found all the facts required by
98
steps 1, 2, and 3 against the defendant.
While the judge in Mr. Whitfield's case later did find all of these
steps against Mr. Whitfield, Ring requires the jury to determine all facts
on which capital punishment is based, not the judge. Therefore, Mr.
Whitfield argued, under Ring, his death sentence had to be reversed and
a sentence of life imprisonment entered in its stead.99
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the State's
countervailing argument and held that Ring did indeed preclude a judge
from making the factual findings required under the statute before a
death sentence could be imposed. 100 The question then arose whether
Mr. Whitfield was entitled to the benefit of Ring since his conviction was
not pending on direct appeal at the time that Ring was decided.
The State argued that Ring could not be applied to Mr. Whitfield or
to any case on collateral review, asserting:
In Griffith [v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 413 (1987)], the Supreme
Court held that a new rule for the conduct for criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively only to cases,
state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet
final. Since appellant's appeal was not pending on
direct review and it was final in June 2002, Ring does not
apply retroactively to appellant's case. 10 1
In other words, as in Amrine, the State took the position that, if the
federal courts would not recognize petitioner's right to relief, then
Missouri and other state courts of last resort were powerless to grant
such relief either.
The Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the approach advocated by
the State, stating:

98
99

State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 270-71 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 256.

Id.
101 Id. at 265-66 (citation omitted).
100
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The State's argument too narrowly construes both
the law applicable in federal courts governing
retroactive application of newly stated federal
procedural rules and this Court's duty and authority to
apply federal constitutional law retroactively.
As to the first concern, Griffith did not set a limit, or
ceiling, on when new procedural rules will be applied to
other cases, but rather a floor. It set out when new
procedural rules must be applied to other cases, stating,
"a new rule for conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending
on direct review or not yet final....." Griffith, 479 U.S. at
328 (emphasis added). Griffith at no point said that a
state cannot apply new criminal procedural rules to cases
on collateral review-indeed, that issue was not before it,
10 2
as Griffith was a direct appeal.
Whitfield then discussed the changing nature of the test applied by
the United States Supreme Court to determine whether to grant
retroactive application to constitutional principles it recognized to state
cases on collateral review. 103 From 1967 until 1989, the Supreme Court
required federal courts to apply the subjective standard set out in the
05
The Linklettercases of Linkletter v. Walker'04 and Stovall v. Denno.1
Stovall analysis required a court to evaluate three factors when
determining whether retroactive application should be given to a new
constitutional standard:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b)
the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities
on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of
10 6
the new standards.

Id. at 266.
Id.
104 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
105
106 Id. at 297.
102
103
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In 1989, the Supreme Court narrowed the basis for federal collateral
review of state convictions in Teague v. Lane.10 7 Whitfield addressed the
holding of Teague as follows:
Under Teague, federal courts may not apply a new
constitutional rule retroactively unless the rule is a
matter of substantive law or, if procedural, it falls within
one of two exceptions: (1) it places "certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power
to
authority
lawmaking
criminal
of
the
1
death
proscribe[,]" 0-for instance, proscribing the
penalty for those who were mentally retarded at the
time of their crime, or (2) it establishes procedures that
"implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial," 10 9
"without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
is seriously diminished." 110
Teague narrowed the situations in which a federal
court will apply a new procedural rule retroactively to
cases on collateral review, setting forth a generally
applicable test rather than permitting federal courts to
continue to make a case-by-case determination based on
the Linkletter-Stovall factors.'
But, Whitfield held, the fact that the federal courts have decided to
narrowly apply constitutional decisions retroactively to cases on
collateral review does not mean the states must also do so. 1 12 Indeed, to
so conclude would be to ignore the very reason that the federal courts
have circumscribed their application of federal constitutional principles
to state courts: the desire to minimize federal interference with state
criminal justice determinations. As the Supreme Court of Nevada noted
in determining that it was not bound to apply Teague in determining the
retroactivity of federal constitutional decisions:
In Teague, the Supreme Court, instead of focusing on
the purpose and impact of a new constitutional rule,

109

489 U.S. 288 (1989).
See id. at 311.
See id. at 312.

110

See id. at 313.

III

State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 267.

107
108

132
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looked to the function of federal habeas review, which is
to ensure that state courts conscientiously follow federal
constitutional standards. The Court determined that this
function is met by testing state convictions against the
constitutional law recognized at the time of trial and
direct appellate review.... Therefore, once a conviction
has become final, federal habeas courts should generally
not interfere with the state courts by applying new rules
retroactively. 113
In so holding, neither Teague nor other Supreme Court cases have
suggested that the states are prohibited from applying constitutional
principles retroactively under state law. To the contrary, it has held that
"[s]tates are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice
system than the Federal Constitution requires." 1 4 For this reason, "[tihe
Supreme Court has recognized that states may apply new constitutional
standards 'in a broader range of cases than is required' by the Court's
decision not to apply the standards retroactively." 115
Of course, not all states have agreed with the above cases. While
none directly hold that a state court is totally without authority to apply
federal constitutional principles retroactively to cases on collateral
review, some cases have simply applied the current federal retroactivity
standard-be it Linkletter or Teague-without apparent consideration of
whether they were free to apply a different standard.1 6 Some cases do

113 Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002).
114 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983).
115 Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470-71 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966)). Colwell
also held "Teague is not controlling on this court, other than in the minimum constitutional
protections established by its two exceptions." Id. at 470; see also State v. Fair, 502 P.2d 1150,
1152 (Or. 1972) ("[Wie are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which
we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give
federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court
requires."). Id.
116 See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 469 N.W.2d 419, 422-23 (Iowa 1991) (assuming without
discussion that Griffith and Teague were determinative of whether it could apply a new
federal constitutional rule retroactively); Meadows v. State, 849 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tenn.
1993) (stating that it must apply Teague's retroactivity analysis to federal constitutional
issues on collateral review, but not to state constitutional or statutory issues); see also
Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform, 27
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 633, 659 (2001-2002).
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of a
so even though the issue before them is whether their interpretation
117
retroactively.
applied
be
should
state constitutional provision
W,hitfield rejected the State's argument that it was required to follow
the retroactivity principles set out in Teague. Noting that, prior to Teague,
Missouri had applied a test based on Linkletter-Stovall, Whitfield
determined that it was up to Missouri whether to continue to apply the
Linkletter-Stovall test, to apply Teague, or to adopt its own test for
determining retroactivity of a new federal constitutional rule to cases on
collateral review. 118 So long as a state's test is not narrower than that set
9
forth in Teague, it will pass constitutional muster." Whitfield determined
that:
[A]s a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to
adopt the Teague analysis but instead chooses to
continue applying the Linkletter-Stovall approach to the
issue of the retroactivity of Ring, an approach that
comports better with Missouri's legal tradition.
Applying the analysis set out in Linkletter-Stovall here,
this Court must consider (1) the purpose to be served by
the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law
enforcement on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the
administration of justice of retroactive application of the
new standards.120
While Mr. Whitfield had filed his claim as a motion for this Court to
recall its mandate affirming his conviction, rather than as a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, hitfleld noted that the same result would obtain
in habeas corpus, stating:
This Court further notes that even were a recall of
mandate not available, defendant would be entitled to

See, e.g., State v. Neer, 795 P.2d 362, 367 (Kan. 1990) (recognizing the Teague analysis as
applicable in deciding the retroactivity of a new state rule); Commonwealth v. Bray, 553
N.E.2d 538, 539-40 (Mass. 1990) (concluding that Teague governed retroactivity of decision
on admissibility of mental impairment on issue of malice under state law); Palin v. Vose,
603 A.2d 738, 74142 (R.I. 1992) (abandoning old Linkletter test once federal courts adopted
Teague and applying it to determine retroactivity of state rule regarding waiver of jury
trial). But see People v. Sexton, 580 N.W.2d 404, 411-12 (Mich. 1998) (holding that the state
is free to determine retroactivity of state rule).
118 State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Mo. 2003).
119
Id.
Id.
120
117
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the same remedy in habeas corpus. In sentencing Mr.
Whitfield to death without a jury finding of factors 1, 2,
and 3 against defendant, the court below imposed a
sentence in excess of that permitted by law. "If a court
imposes a sentence that is in excess of that authorized by
law, habeas corpus is a proper remedy." State ex rel.
Osowski v. Purkett, 908 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Mo. banc 1995),
citing, State ex rel. Dutton v. Sevier, 83 S.W.2d 581, 582-83
(Mo. 1935).
In such a case, the rules regarding
preservation of error by raising the error on direct
appeal or in authorized post-conviction motions do not
apply, for "those waivers do not affect his objection that
the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law." Id.
Such an error is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived.
See[,] e.g.[,] Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485,
489 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).121
The majority found these principles favored retroactive application,
vacated the death sentence, and directed entry of a sentence of life
imprisonment. 122 Missouri is not alone in recognizing that it has a choice
whether to follow Teague. In deciding whether to apply a recent federal
constitutional decision retroactively to the case before it, Figarola v.
State' 23 similarly found that while "[slome states have adopted Teague
without discussing the fact that Teague is not binding on state courts
when they are determining if their own decisions are retroactive.... The
policy considerations behind Teague are not necessarily the same as those
for state court post-conviction relief." 124 Florida chose to follow Linkletter
rather than Teague.125 As discussed above, Nevada similarly recognized
the authority of state courts to give federal constitutional rights broader
126
retroactive application in Colwell v. State.
Cowell v. Leapley127 took the same approach, noting that the lower
courts erred in holding that a new United States Supreme Court decision

Id. at 269 n.19.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge William Ray Price concurred that Missouri was free to,
and would continue to, apply the Linkletter-Stovall test, but argued that the remedy should
be remand for a new trial rather than entry of a life sentence.
123
841 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
124
Id. at 577 n.1.
125
Id. at 576-77.
126
59 P.3d 463 (Nev. 2002).
127
458 N.W.2d 514 (S.D. 1990).
121

122
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would not be given retroactive effect just because the federal courts
might not give it retroactive effect, stating that the United States
"Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect" and
that "[elach sovereign has the right to decide how it will allow access to
this extraordinary remedy." 128 Cowell found Teague too restrictive and
chose not to follow it.129
A number of other states, after recognizing that they are free to
adopt any rule so long as it is not more restrictive than Griffith and
Teague, have chosen to follow the federal standards set out in those cases,
noting, "our courts have always adverted to then-existing federal
retroactivity standards when applying new federal constitutional
rules." 130 Similarly, State ex rel. Taylor v. 1'hitley, 131 while stating "we
recognize that we are not bound to adopt the Teague standards," 132 did so
anyway because it found the Linkletter test it had previously applied too
33
vague and subjective.
While merely adopting the federal test for retroactivity to cases on
collateral review is certainly simpler and may ensure that the results in
state habeas proceedings are consistent with the results that would be
obtained on habeas review by the federal courts, this approach ignores
the difference in function of state versus federal habeas review. While
the United States Constitution may dictate the substantive basis of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions on issues such as the right to
counsel, the right to a jury determination of the facts underlying the
death penalty, and so forth, the Constitution does not address when and
how those decisions are to be applied to pending cases. How the federal
courts will apply their decisions to pending cases on direct or collateral
review has been left to court decision or statute.
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court determined that new
constitutional decisions would be applied to cases on direct and

in
Id.at 517.
129 Id. at 518.

130 State v. Zuniga, 444 S.E.2d 443,446 (N.C. 1994).
131 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992).
132 Id. at 1296.

133 Id. at 1296-97. Accord State v. Slemmer, 823 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1991) (finding retroactivity
analysis sufficiently complex that state would for simplicity follow federal approach); State
v. Mohler, 694 N.W.2d 1129 (Ind.1998).
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collateral review alike.134 In Griffith and Teague, it determined that
principles of fairness required that it continue to apply its new
constitutional decisions to cases still pending on direct review.
However, principles of comity and finality, and the desire to avoid the
tension caused by what was often seen as undue meddling of federal
courts in state court jurisprudence, 135 would outweigh these fairness
considerations in cases on collateral review unless the new rule fit within
136
narrowly defined exceptions.
In particular, the Supreme Court held that, "[a]pplication of
constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final
seriously undermines the principle of finality." 137 And, to the extent that
the purpose of federal habeas review is to encourage state courts to
follow federal constitutional law, then, "[i]n order to perform this
deterrence function, ... the habeas court need only apply the
constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original
38
proceedings took place."1
In AEDPA, the legislature codified this rule in narrow form, stating
that federal courts shall not grant a writ of habeas corpus to one whose
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court "unless the
adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
139
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
But, the policy concerns behind Teague are only "partly germane to
collateral review by this and other state courts.... We share the concern
that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed, but the need to
prevent excessive interference by federal habeas courts has no
40
application to habeas review by state courts themselves."

134 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The
Impact ofTeague v. Lane on State PostconvictionRemedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 422 (1993).
135 Flood, supra note 116, at 639.
136 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). The two situations in which a new
constitutional rule will be applied to cases on collateral review are where the new rule: (1)
places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe," and (2) is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty." Id. at 307.
137 Id. at 309.

m Id. at 306.
139 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
140 Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002).
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In other words, the change in the federal approach to habeas corpus
so evident in Teague and its progeny did not result from a change in the
nature of the writ itself, but from a desire to lessen federal interference
with state courts. "Thus, it would be fallacious for states to adopt the
Teague formula under the guise of reforming habeas, when the purpose
141
of that decision was to decrease federal interference with the states."
Or, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated the principle:
It would be a bitter irony indeed if our [state] courts, in
an attempt to accommodate the Supreme Court's
retrenchment of federal habeas review, were artificially
to elevate procedural rulings over substantive
adjudications in post-conviction review, at a time when
the Court's curtailment of [federal] habeas review forces
state prisoners to rely increasingly on state postconviction proceedings as their last resort for vindicating
their state and federal constitutional rights. 142
Judge Dennis was even more direct in dissent in State ex rel. Taylor v.
lhitley,143 stating, "[R]eplication of the United States Supreme Court's

rule in this area does not promote the goals of federalism; instead, in selfdefeating circularity, the majority [by adopting Teague] blindly replicates
the very federal habeas rule by which the High Court attempts to accord
comity to our state laws and decisions."' 44
IV. CONCLUSION

While the underpinning of federal habeas review is to ensure that
the states recognize and apply federal statutory and constitutional
principles to cases tried in their courts, state courts are not so limited.
Even in the absence of an underlying federal constitutional violation in a
criminal defendant's trial, state courts and legislatures are free to
develop procedures by which a criminal defendant, such as Mr. Amrine,
can bring claims of actual innocence.

Hutton, supra note 134, at 449.
State v. Preciose, 609 A.2d 1280, 1294 (N.J. 1992). As one commentator stated the
concern, "Federal procedural default rules are predicated on notions of comity and respect
for state court rules; state courts cannot rely on the same logic to justify procedural
defaults. Yet the state procedural bars have clearly been enacted to echo the retrenchment
of federal habeas." Flood, supra note 116, at 659.
143 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992).
144 Id. at 1303 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
141
142
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State courts are also free to apply their own notions of retroactivity
in determining the application of constitutional principles to cases on
collateral review, such as Whitfield. They are not required to, and should
not, act in lockstep with the federal courts on issues that are, at heart,
matters of state rather than federal law, for state application of federal
constitutional rules is not limited by principles of comity. Therefore, the
fact that the federal courts have retrenched on their oversight of state
criminal jurisprudence does not require similar retrenchment on the part
of state courts. 145 To the contrary, "[w]hile the substance of what is to be
applied is a federal constitutional matter, the decision on what criteria to
use to determine prospective or retroactive application is a
nonconstitutional state decision." 146
The Missouri Constitution preserves to Missouri citizens the right to
petition for habeas corpus. 147 Other state constitutions also recognize
this writ. Except in the narrow class of cases to which the United States
Supreme Court has stated its constitutional pronouncements must apply,
state courts are free to determine the extent of the retroactive application
of new constitutional rules to cases on collateral review in their state.
Missouri has followed this path in its recent decisions in Amrine and
Whitfield. In those cases, Missouri chose to permit broader review.
Other states, in light of their own concerns and jurisprudence, may more
narrowly interpret the right to habeas review under state law. But, these
are decisions each state is free to make based on its own application of
principles of finality and due process, without being limited by concerns
of federalism and comity.

"Regardless of whether one agrees that federalism and comity should be pursued to
such extreme lengths by the United States Supreme Court, there is no justification for a
state supreme court to imitate the High Court in this respect." Id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
146 Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D. 1990).
147 "That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended."
Mo.
CONST. art. 1,§ 12.
145
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